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Abstract
The phenomenological tradition has long contended that natural perception is neither con-
ceptually articulated nor governed by deterministic laws, but rather organized according to the
practically articulated structure of bodily being-in-the-world. But this leaves the problem of ex-
plaining how perception can provide justificatory support to thought. The phenomenologists’
answer is to say that the meaningful (but not conceptual) structure of natural perception
makes it possible for us to think about objects by motivating particular thoughts about the ob-
jects as they present themselves in perception. I show how this view provides a way out of wor-
ries that plague contemporary philosophy of mind.
A measure of the remarkable influence of cartesian dualism is found in the
fact that it often constrains even the ways in which it is rejected. Few accept,
it is true, the basic picture of a dualism of mental and physical substances.
But a dualism still shapes the philosophy of mind – for instance, in that al-
most everyone sees as central the task of figuring out the relation between
mind and body. And it sometimes seems as if the only possible accounts of
human beings consist in either giving a mental description, or a physical
description, or explaining how the mental descriptions and the physical de-
scriptions relate to one another other.
This same dualism constrains the ways in which perception is understood.
Much of the controversy over the nature of perception is driven, however,
by the way that the objects of perception seem to resist categorization as
either mental or physical. They stand in an odd position in the sense that,
while they are available for thought, they are also independent of thought.
This independence is manifest, for instance, in the way that not every fea-
ture of a perceived object is presented in perception at once. It is also
manifest in the way that no single thought or series of thoughts we have
about the object could exhaust all there is to be thought about it. As
Merleau-Ponty notes,
»… each aspect of the thing which falls to our perception is still only an invitation to perceive
beyond it, still only a momentary halt in the perceptual process. If the thing itself were
reached, it would be from that moment arrayed before us and stripped of its mystery. It would
cease to exist as a thing at the very moment when we thought to possess it. What makes the
‘reality’ of the thing is therefore precisely what snatches it from our grasp.«2
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But there is no small tension between these two features of mind-trans-
cendent objects, at least for certain ways of conceiving of on object’s con-
current availability to and independence of thought. For example, on the
transcendental idealist position that an object is available for thought pre-
cisely because we constitute it in thought, it is hard to see how it could be
independent of thought. But, of course, such a position is given impetus in
the first place by the sense that, if the object is not constituted in terms of
our concepts, it is equally hard to see how it could be available for thought.
Recent work by John McDowell3 has suggested that one way to eliminate
this tension is to reject an unnecessary exclusivity between causal and logi-
cal structures — between the »space of reasons« and the »realm of law«, in
McDowell’s terminology. While accepting in modified form the traditional
distinction between the conceptual structure of the space of reasons, and
the structure operative in the realm of law (i.e., of natural objects and their
impingements on our natural bodies), McDowell proposes that perceptual
experience can be understood in terms of conceptual powers permeating
and being operative in operations of sensibility characterized in terms of
the realm of law. Such a view would, it seems to me, resolve the tension
outlined above. But it would do so by giving a phenomenologically inaccu-
rate account of perception.
Amongst phenomenologists, by contrast, the solution is found not in ac-
commodating the mental and the physical, but in uncovering a content
proper to perception (and action, for that matter) which is neither causal
nor logical in structure. Merleau-Ponty, for instance, argues that no varia-
tion played out in cartesian terms will ever account for the human mode of
being in the world. »There are two classical views«, he notes:
»… one treats man as the result of the physical, physiological, and sociological influences
which shape him from outside and make him one thing among many; the other consists of
recognizing an a-cosmic freedom in him, insofar as he is spirit and represents to himself the
very causes which supposedly act upon him«.4
For Merleau-Ponty, »neither view is satisfactory«;5 any adequate account of
human existence will need recourse to a mode of explanation that is neither
causal nor rational, and it will need to see the content of human states as
neither physiological nor logical. Merleau-Ponty argues that the model for
understanding human being can not be either that of the inferential and
justificatory relations of explicit thought, nor that of the blind and mecha-
nistic workings of material causality. Instead, he proposes that the para-
digm should be the »perception of our own body and the perception of ex-
ternal things« which, when properly understood,
»… provide an example… of consciousness not in possession of fully determinate objects, that
of a logic lived through which cannot account for itself, and that of an immanent meaning
which is not clear to itself and becomes fully aware of itself only through experiencing certain
natural signs«.6
The dualist assumption of minds in an objective, material world, in other
words, mistakes both the objects of experience and the consciousness of
those objects – the former it treats as fully objective and determinate, the
latter as self-evident and fully available for reflection. If we are to capture
the true character of our experience of the world, Merleau-Ponty suggests,
»a complete reform of understanding is called for« (49).
In this paper, I pursue one step in the »complete reform« by considering
an alternative approach to that of McDowell, discussed above. Where
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McDowell seeks to dissolve the tension by suggesting that perceptual expe-
rience is conceptually articulated, phenomenologists like Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty maintain that »natural« perception – the kind of percep-
tion in which we are absorbed while engaged in our natural, everyday
course of affairs – is most properly and accurately characterized in non-
conceptual terms. In particular, natural perception is neither conceptually
articulated nor governed by deterministic laws, but rather organized ac-
cording to the practically articulated structure of bodily being-in-the-world.
The independence of objects from thought, on the phenomenological pic-
ture, is understood in terms of the objects’ non-conceptual presence in per-
ceptual experience. But this leaves the problem of explaining how such ob-
jects can be present to thought. The phenomenologists’ answer is to say
that the meaningful (but not conceptual) structure of natural perception
makes it possible for us to think about objects by motivating particular
thoughts about the objects as they present themselves in perception. This
allows us to see that the non-conceptual experience of natural perception
grounds our thoughts by
»… arrang[ing] around the subject a world which speaks to him of himself, and gives his own
thoughts their place in the world«.7
The phenomenologists, in short, would see McDowell’s position as driven
by an unnecessarily dichotomous way of thinking that can’t do justice to
perceptual experience. To make the case for the phenomenologically-in-
spired account, it will be necessary to explain how a phenomenology of
pre-propositional manifestness differs from what Sellars labelled the ‘Myth
of the Given’, or the view that propositional states can be rationally sup-
ported by non-propositional contents. McDowell has, rightly to my mind,
followed Sellars in criticizing as untenable the idea of a given that ration-
ally supports our beliefs. This has led McDowell to argue that perceptual
experience should be thought of as conceptually-articulated through and
through, for only if it is can it stand in any sort of grounding or justificatory
relationship to other intentional states. Similar consideration have led phi-
losophers like Davidson to argue that the world as causally constituted can
cause, but not rationally support, our beliefs about the world. These seem
like the only plausible alternatives as long as there is no non-myth-of-the-
given way of characterizing the relationship of thoughts to non-logical and
non-causal perceptual contents. Thus, if the dichotomous account of spa-
ces and realms is to be rejected, and the phenomenological observation is
to be vindicated, one would need to distinguish it from the myth of the
given account.
To be more precise, a complete vindication would require that one show
both (1) how perceptual content is not necessarily propositional, and (2)
how non-propositional contents can in some sense ground propositional
states and attitudes. Rather than offer an argument on the first issue, how-
ever, I will to a large extent simply accept Heidegger’s and Merleau-
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Ponty’s phenomenological description of perception as non-conceptually
articulated.8 I believe that the description is correct. But I will not be trying
to justify it here, because I would like to focus on articulating the phe-
nomenological answer to the second question.
Before doing this, however, I want to explore briefly the way that McDow-
ell’s approach to the problem is driven by a dualism of logical and causal
structures. I think this point is helpfully illustrated by reviewing the idea of
intentional content, and the development of McDowell’s argument as a re-
sponse to Davidson’s account of intentional content.
1. The Problem of Intentional Content
I want to begin by taking a more detailed look at the tension between the
presence of objects to thought and the independence of objects from
thought. One traditional, and I think correct, way of cashing out the notion
of »presence« to thought is in terms of success in directing our thoughts at
objects in the world. Whatever else we say about directedness toward the
world, we can be sure that our thoughts, our propositional attitudes, are
not directed toward objects in the world if satisfaction of those attitudes
does not depend (at least to some degree) on the state of the world. Thus,
any complete explanation of our relationship to the things around us must
be able to provide an account of how intentional attitudes derive their con-
tent from the objects themselves. Without such an account, our ability to
think about, desire, entertain beliefs about (etc.,) mind-transcendent ob-
jects seems magical.
The obvious source of intentional content is the world itself as we encoun-
ter it in our everyday activities. The propositions we entertain and the con-
cepts we employ seem to be responsive to our experience of the world. It is
natural to think, then, that content finds its way into our intentions as we
form and revise concepts in the light of our interaction with the world.
There is undoubtedly something right about this thought. But given that
our perceptual interaction with the world is seemingly an interaction be-
tween material bodies, and thus is best characterized in causal terms, the
problem becomes: how can a causal interaction give rise to conceptually
contentful states?
In the empiricist tradition of thought, the content of our thoughts is more
or less directly »keyed«, as Quine says, to causal stimulations of our sen-
sory surfaces. »Two cardinal tenets of empiricism remain«, according to
Quine, »unassailable«:
»One is that whatever evidence there is for science is sensory evidence. The other … is that all
inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence.«9
In Quine’s case, the content of our observation sentences is tied to »the
temporally ordered class of receptors triggered during the specious pre-
sent«.10 Thus, even though his attack on the »Two Dogmas of Empiricism«
undermined the idea of any tight connection between sentences or thoughts
on the one hand, and particular causal interactions with the world on the
other, his philosophy is nevertheless party to the empiricist view that con-
tent is bestowed on our intentions by a causal interaction with the world.
There is, however, a problem with any view that sees the content of inten-
tional states as consisting in merely sensory stimulations – namely, explain-
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ing how sensations give rise to properly propositional contents. It is not
clear how sensations can contribute either to fixing the content of our
thoughts and utterances, or of providing rational justification for them.
Adding sensations or other intermediaries to the mix adds a new problem –
explaining how sensations can be grouped together in such a way as to cor-
respond to the familiar objects of the world we inhabit, for it is to these fa-
miliar objects that our thoughts and words (at least for the most part) are
directed. More importantly, adding sensations as intermediaries between
our thoughts and the world serves to undermine the idea that we are in di-
rect contact with a mind-transcendent world. This is because, as Davidson
notes,
»… patterns of stimulation, like sense data, can not be identified and described without refe-
rence to ‘what goes on around us’. If our knowledge of the world derives entirely from evi-
dence of this kind, then not only may our senses sometimes deceive us; it is possible that we
are systematically and generally deceived… The familiar trouble is, of course, that the discon-
nection creates a gap no reasoning or construction can plausibly bridge. Once the Cartesian
starting point has been chosen, there is no saying what the evidence is evidence for, or so it
seems. Idealism, reductionist forms of empiricism, and skepticism loom.«11
Moreover, Davidson argues that any theory that attempts to ground our
thoughts in such intermediaries must be able to explain »what, exactly, is
the relation between sensation and belief that allows the first to justify the
second?«12 The problem is that »the relation between a sensation and a be-
lief cannot be logical, since sensations are not beliefs or other proposi-
tional attitudes«.13 If Davidson’s argument is correct, we’re left with two
potentially incompatible assumptions: first, that our perceptual encounter
with the world is a causal transaction; and, second, that thoughts, being
propositional in content, are rationally responsive only to other proposi-
tional entities. The assumptions are incompatible if we can see no way to
move from a causal transaction to a propositional content. Their incom-
patibility is a problem if we want to tell a convincing story about how our
thoughts can be in contact with mind-transcendent objects – hence, the
tension observed in the introduction.
One obvious way to avoid the incompatibility is to see the causal transac-
tion as generating in us a propositional state – a belief about the world.
And this, in fact, is Davidson’s view:
»What then is the relation? The answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations
cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs.«14
Once we’ve acquired a language, Davidson claims, the world can cause us
to have beliefs. Davidson calls this kind of interaction with the world »pro-
positional perception«. With language, he argues, comes the capacity for
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propositional thought. In virtue of this capacity, the world can cause us di-
rectly to have perceptual beliefs. But then there is no need to give percep-
tual experience itself a justificatory role in relation to those beliefs:
»Of course, our sense-organs are part of the causal chain from world to perceptual belief. But
not all causes are reasons: the activation of our retinas does not constitute our evidence that
we see a dog, nor do the vibrations of the little hairs in the inner ear provide reasons to think
the dog is barking. ‘I saw it with my own eyes’ is a legitimate reason for believing there was an
elephant in the supermarket. But this reports no more than that something I saw caused me
to believe there was an elephant in the supermarket.«15
Thus, on Davidson’s view, we are, as physical organisms, interacting caus-
ally with the world, and this interaction bears no information with a propo-
sitional content. But it does, in virtue of our linguistic capacities, causally
give rise to perceptual beliefs.
This is a coherent story to tell, but it does have one fateful consequence for
the idea of intentional content. Because the world acts only causally in the
production of our beliefs, and causes can not serve as reasons for holding
beliefs, it follows that we can be indifferent about which causes we corre-
late with which beliefs. The result is an indeterminacy of reference – that
is, an inability to find any unique correlation between a particular object as
causally constituted, and a particular belief.
The consequence of this indeterminacy, as McDowell is quick to point out,
is that we can put down no fixed linkages between our beliefs about the
world and the particular features of the world. As Quine explained,
»… the total field [of beliefs] is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience,
that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any sin-
gle contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements
in the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting
the field as a whole.«16
But without fixed linkages, McDowell argues, we put at risk the idea that
our ideas are about the world at all:
»… we can make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking only by conceiving it as
answerable to the empirical world for its correctness, and we can understand answerability to
the empirical world only as mediated by answerability to the tribunal of experience, conceived
in terms of the world’s direct impacts on possessors of perceptual capacities«.17
As McDowell explains,
»… if we do not let intuitions stand in rational relations to [thoughts], it is exactly their pos-
session of content that is put in question. When Davidson argues that a body of beliefs is sure
to be mostly true, he helps himself to the idea of a body of beliefs, a body of states that have
content. And that means that, however successfully the argument might work on its own
terms, it comes too late to neutralize the real problem.«18
McDowell thus, by contrast to Davidson, argues that the idea of intentional
content is only coherent if we can see our way to attributing to things in the
world a more-than-causal role. McDowell proposes that we avoid the in-
compatibility between the causal structure of perceptual interactions with
objects and the rational relations between perceptions and beliefs by sup-
posing that, in causally interacting with us, the world draws on our concep-
tual capacities. Thus, the world is presented at the outset as being proposi-
tionally articulated. The difference is thus that for McDowell, and not for
Davidson, in our experience of the world itself, we can see the world as
bearing the kind of content to which our thoughts can be responsive. In
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other words, McDowell’s approach would redeem the idea of intentional
content by explaining how our thoughts can be directly responsive to expe-
rience.
The interesting point is, however, that despite their differences, McDowell
and Davidson are both in agreement that if the content of perception is not
conceptually articulated then it can stand at best in a merely causal rela-
tionship to intentions. They differ only on whether the world presents itself
to us in perceptual experience as conceptually articulated.
Phenomenologists in the tradition of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, how-
ever, are convinced on the basis of the phenomenology of perception that
our propositional states and attitudes are grounded, not caused, in our ex-
perience of the world, and that our experience lacks, for the most part, a
propositional structure. Before turning to a discussion of this ‘grounding’
relationship, however, I want briefly to review the phenomenological basis
for the claim that most experience is not conceptually articulated.
2. Natural and Propositional Perception
A central feature of both Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of
perception is an insistence that intentional modes of comportment depend
on pre-conceptual modes of being-in-the-world. This is because, both
argue, intentional modes of comportment are directed toward their objects
via propositional contents, and propositional contents can only have an
object in virtue of a pre-propositional manifestness of the objects of our in-
tentions. Heidegger’s insistence on this point seems to be motivated by the
following observation: our ability to make assertions about things or have
explicit thoughts about things – i.e., our ability to be in states or attitudes
characterizable in terms of a propositional content – seems to depend on
removing ourselves from a fluid practical involvement with those things,
and in removing ourselves from a fluid practical involvement, our experi-
ence of the situation itself seems to change.
In »natural perception« – our perception of things in the course of our eve-
ryday commerce in the world – Heidegger notes that what we perceive is
not readily available for thought. Indeed, he argues that the very idea that
we can think about our natural perception of something is a »constructivist
violation of the facts«. This is because
»… we never think a single thing in our natural comportment toward things, and whenever we
grasp it expressly for itself, we take it out of a context to which it belongs according to its con-
tent«.19
The context to which Heidegger is referring is »the equipmental context«,
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»The contexture of things as they surround us here stands in view, but not for the contempla-
tor as though we were sitting here in order to describe the things.«20
Heidegger calls the kind of seeing we perform in natural perception »cir-
cumspection«. In circumspection, the objects around us »stand at first,
completely unobtrusive and unthought«. Indeed, we do not propositionally
apprehend things at all in circumspection:
»When we enter here through the door, we do not apprehend the seats, and the same holds
for the doorknob. Nevertheless, they are there in this peculiar way: we go by them circum-
spectly, avoid them circumspectly, stumble against them, and the like.«21
Similarly, Merleau-Ponty argues that in our dealings with familiar situa-
tions, »just as we do not see the eyes of a familiar face, but simply its look
and its expression, so we perceive hardly any object«.22 He explains:
»… in the natural attitude, I do not have perceptions, I do not posit this object as beside that
one, along with their objective relationships, I have a flow of experiences which imply and ex-
plain each other both simultaneously and successively«.23
Acts of explicit perception – perception in which we see determinate ob-
jects in determinate relationships to one another – only emerge from »am-
biguous perceptions«. By this, I take it, Merleau-Ponty means that a per-
ceptual experience becomes articulated in a way that would lend itself to
discovering rational relations only when a particular need arises – such as
when the ambiguity of the situation resists any ready response, and thereby
prevents us from continuing in the »flow of experiences«. As a conse-
quence, such derived forms of perceptual experience should not be taken
as paradigmatic:
»… they cannot be of any use in the analysis of the perceptual field, since they are extracted
from it at the very outset, since they presuppose it and since we come by them by making use
of precisely those set of groupings with which we have become familiar in dealing with the
world«.24
Thus, both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are committed to the view that
much of our perceptual experience of the world is articulated according to
the »groupings« of our familiar, practical dealings with the world. As I
have already noted, I don’t intend to offer an argument to show that these
practical groupings are incommensurate with conceptual articulations. The
argument here is restricted, instead, to establishing that, if natural percep-
tion is non-conceptually articulated, then it can nevertheless ground propo-
sitional perceptions and thoughts.
This hypothetical claim should be of interest, not just in its own right, but
also because its denial is itself part of McDowell’s argument against non-
conceptual content. McDowell’s argument turns on two claims: first, that it
is always possible to articulate a proposition precisely as detailed as the
content of perception,25 and, second, as we have already seen, that if the
content of perception were not already conceptually articulated, then it
could only stand in a causal relationship to our propositional attitudes.
With regard to the first claim, it does at least fend off a certain brand of ar-
gument in support of the view that perceptual experience is not conceptual
– namely, the argument that experience can’t be conceptually articulated
because concepts are too crude a way of dividing the world to do justice to
the detailed nature of our experience of it. But, of course, there is a diffe-
rence between being describable as…, and being already articulated in
terms of… Thus, this observation will not, by itself, undermine the phe-
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nomenological account of the content of natural perception. Nevertheless,
if we believe that our thoughts need to be supported in some way by our
natural perception of the world, and we accept the second claim – that they
cannot be supported in the right way unless our perception is conceptually
articulated – then this would be enough to throw the phenomenological
account into doubt. And so, it is to the second claim that I now turn.
As I have noted, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are both committed to a
denial of this claim. But what can be said in response? First, I think it is im-
portant to see that the Davidson/McDowell line of argument does teach us
something about the way to construe a pre-conceptual experience of the
world, and the relationship such an experience has to propositional thoughts
about the world. In particular, the relationship cannot be an inferential or
justificatory relationship – such a relationship could only hold between re-
lata with the same kind of content (namely, a conceptual content). But nor
can a pre-conceptual experience of the world be an experience of some-
thing that cannot possibly be picked out conceptually. We can see this
without accepting McDowell’s argument that demonstratives in point of
fact make language flexible enough to pick out anything that can be experi-
enced (although I am inclined to accept McDowell’s argument on this
point). It also follows directly from that fact that, if the objects of our per-
ceptions so completely resisted description in conceptual terms, it would
make it impossible to see how being directed to them could inform or
ground the content of a propositional attitude.
What we need, then, is a way to think of the content of our natural percep-
tions as describable in conceptual terms, but not articulated in conceptual
terms. Now, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty both hold that once we break
out of the flow of experiences, we can come to see the same things that
were previously articulated pragmatically as being conceptually articulated.
Heidegger describes the distinction in content between a pragmatic and
conceptual articulation as a distinction between different kinds of ‘as’
structures – the hermeneutic ‘as’ of circumspective understanding versus
the apophantic ‘as’ of assertion.26 That is, in simply pragmatically coping
with something, I am treating it as something. But I am not yet necessarily
taking it as something that can figure in thoughts, be expressed in words,
etc. Of course, once the change-over from the hermeneutic to the apo-
phantic ‘as’ occurs, there is no mystery how our experiences, now concep-
tually articulated, could rationally connect with our thoughts. But this is, of
course, no solution at all since we would still need to say how natural per-
ception, being non-conceptually articulated, could stand in a grounding re-
lationship to propositional perception, being conceptually articulated. And
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experience could non-rationally ground, rather than cause, a conceptually
articulated thought.
What we first need to consider is how a relationship of non-rational
grounding differs from a relationship of rational grounding. An experience
is able to provide rational grounding to the extent that it is available for
use in inference and justification. Thus, we can conclude that if the experi-
ence that gives rise to the thought is not available for use in inference and
justification, then the thought is not rationally grounded. This is, of course,
precisely McDowell’s (and Davidson’s) objection to seeing the relationship
between thoughts and perceptual experiences as a causal relationship – a
belief cannot be inferred from or justified by a cause (although, of course,
it might be inferred from or justified by a belief about the cause).
3. Motivations
If there were some features of our perceptual experience which are not
available for use in inference or justification, but which nevertheless dis-
pose us (rather than cause us) to have the thoughts that we do, then we
could say that the perceptual experience stands to the thought in a non-
rational grounding relationship. Merleau-Ponty calls such relationships
‘motivational’, and explicitly distinguishes them both from relationships of
‘objective cause’ and from rational relationships. Non-phenomenological
approaches to perception, he argues,
»… can choose only between reason and cause… On the other hand, the phenomenological
notion of motivation is one of those ‘fluid’ concepts which have to be formed if we want to get
back to phenomena. One phenomenon releases another, not by means of some objective effi-
cient cause, like those which link together natural events, but by the meaning which it holds
out – there is a raison d’Être for a thing which guides the flow of phenomena without being ex-
plicitly laid down in any one of them, a sort of operative reason.«27
To get a handle on this ‘fluid’ concept, let’s review briefly a couple of the
examples Merleau-Ponty adduces in illustration of it. I will then conclude
by saying a word or two by way of explaining how this would constitute a
way out of the dichotomy between reasons and causes that traps even
McDowell, despite his best efforts to show that the realm of law and the
domain of reasons are not mutually exclusive.
Let’s first distinguish motivation from rational grounding by looking at
some examples meant to show how something can be present in perceptual
experience, can dispose us to having a thought or propositional perception,
but can nevertheless not be available for inference or justification. Mer-
leau-Ponty illustrates this by noting that only after centuries of painting did
artists perceive that reflection on the eye without which the eye remains
dull and sightless as in the paintings of the early masters. The reflection is
not seen as such, since it was in fact able to remain unnoticed for so long,
and yet it has its function in perception, since its mere absence deprives ob-
jects and faces of all life and expression. The reflection is seen only inci-
dentally. It is not presented to our perception as an objective, but as an
auxiliary or mediating element. It is not seen itself, but makes us to see the
rest.28
Suppose, in other words, that I see that there is a live person standing in
front of me. My seeing this, it turns out, is grounded in part in the fact that
the reflection of light on the eye of the person is a part of what I see, but
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not present in such a way that it is available for use as a reason for my see-
ing that there is a person there. The fact that the reflection remained
unnoticed, even in the face of centuries of effort to faithfully capture what
it is that we do see, provides prima facie evidence that what we saw was not
available to thought, and thus could not ground an inference (from the fact
that I see a reflection on the eye to the conclusion that I see a person, for
instance), or could not serve to justify the belief that I see a person. The
role the reflection plays, instead, is to dispose me to seeing a person there
in front of me (rather than, say, a mannequin).
Generalizing on such examples, Merleau-Ponty argues that all our concep-
tually articulated perceptual experiences are motivated by the existential
grasp we have on the world around us – that is, by a preceding familiarity
with the world and how to act in it. Because this familiarity with the world
is itself the condition of our ability to see that anything is the case, and
hence, of our ability to reason, it is not itself generally available for use in
inference and justification. To take another example, our ability to see ob-
jects in the world is motivated by our experience of space. »A poplar on the
road which is drawn smaller than a man« Merleau-Ponty notes, »succeeds
in becoming really and truly a tree only by retreating towards the hori-
zon«.29 That we see it as a tree (and thus as describable by the word ‘tree’,
or as instantiating the concept tree) depends, in other words, on our ability
to situate it spatially. But there is no reason for situating the tree spatially
in the way that we do, we can appeal to no conceptually articulated feature
of our experience of the drawing which justifies the spatial orientation we
give it, if only because everything we see in the picture is equally a conse-
quence of, and thus not a basis for, the spatiality into which it gets organi-
zed. If there is no reason for seeing the tree as receding toward the hori-
zon, and hence as a tree, then what makes us see it in this way? It is moti-
vated by the fact that seeing it in that way gives us the best practical grip on
the scene. Our way of being in the world is one in which we are ready for
objects to be situated at varying depths. This readiness, no doubt, is in-
grained into our bodies by the fact that the world itself is arrayed about us
in three dimensions. As a result, our mode of being in the world motivates
us to see objects as arrayed three-dimensionally. This mode of being, in
other words, grounds our perception by motivating our seeing of the object
at the appropriate depth.
A motivational relationship is, then, one in which the environing world, in
virtue of the practical significance that its various quarters hold for us, op-
erates on us by drawing us into a particular kind of readiness. This readi-
ness, in turn, by projecting into the world a determinate kind of activity,
‘polarizes’ our experience of the world, bringing certain elements of the en-
vironment into salience, and concealing others.30 Because our involvement
in the world is geared to particular elements of the environment, when that
involvement gives rise to thoughts, we can see those thoughts as responsive
to, and bearing on, particular objects.
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»For the normal person his projects polarize
the world, bringing magically to view a host
of signs which guide action, as notices in a
museum guide the visitor.« Phenomenology
of Perception, p. 112.
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But now to complete the story, we need to be able to say something about
why the motivational story doesn’t simply collapse into a variant on David-
son’s account – why, that is, we don’t simply say that our bodily disposition
causes us to situate the object spatially in the way that we do. The response
is to be found in the way that the particular readiness for the world that we
have in our pre-thematic involvement with the world is a direct response to
specific features of the world.31 We saw already that the heteronomy of
reasons and mere causes means that we can be indifferent about the way
we correlate particular thoughts with particular objects causally defined.
»No appeal to causality can affect the determinacy of reference«, Davidson
notes, »if the only significant effects are responses to whole sentences«.32
This is because sentences can only be interpreted within the context of a
whole pattern of beliefs which, in turn, is given content only by being
mapped on to truth conditions. The current pattern of causal stimulations
of the agent being interpreted are, of course, important features to take
into consideration while carrying out the mapping. But they will be much
too sparse as points of reference to fix the whole context of beliefs. As long
as different mappings are equivalent in terms of reserving the overall truth
and coherence of the beliefs being mapped, there is no basis for distin-
guishing between them.
But the world as experienced in natural perception and the bodily readi-
ness that motivate both natural and propositional perceptions are not in-
different to each other in the same way. A bodily readiness, while not ne-
cessarily responsive to conceptually delineated features of the world, never-
theless operates in a meaningfully ordered world, and, as a consequence,
will only respond to a meaningfully rather than causally delineated object.
Because a particular kind of being ready is always a current involvement
with particular things in a particular context, it can’t be mapped arbitrarily
onto whatever feature of the environing world we choose. A particular
readiness will only be motivated by particular situations, and will only un-
cover particular features of the world to us. Thus, it follows that motiva-
tional relationships are not merely causal influences on perception. In-
stead, they serve in an important sense as a ground of propositional
thoughts.
4. Conclusion
If we return, now, to the problem of the transcendence of the objects of
perception, we can see that the notion of motivation allows phenomeno-
logy to offer a fuller account of the way in which objects are present to, but
independent of thought.
For Davidson, the object’s independence of thought is understood in terms
of its causal constitution. But, as McDowell objects, this means that mind-
independent objects cannot possibly have any direct rational bearing on
thought at all, and thus threatens to put the mind out of contact with a
transcendent world altogether. »We need to conceive this expansive spon-
taneity [of thought] as subject to control from outside our thinking«,
McDowell complains, »on pain of representing the operations of spontane-
ity as a frictionless spinning in a void«.33
What McDowell can’t account for, on the other hand, is the way that
mind-transcendent objects present themselves in perception as in some
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way irreducible to all the things we could say or think about them. For
McDowell, it is enough to make an object transcendent that »the spontane-
ity of the understanding can be constrained by the receptivity of sensibil-
ity«.34 He argues that our »craving for a limit to freedom« can be satisfied,
that is, simply by seeing that »in experience one finds oneself saddled with
content«.35 Indeed, to demand any more, McDowell believes, would force
us once again into putting the mind-transcendent world beyond the reaches
of our thought.
The phenomenologists, however, have proposed a third way of understand-
ing the mind-transcendent object. The object transcends thought in that its
presence in perception is not articulated conceptually. But this doesn’t
force us into seeing thought as cut off from any direct relation to the
mind-transcendent world, so long as we see the world as motivating a bod-
ily disposition which, in turn, motivates the thoughts we can bring to bear
on the world. At the same time, the phenomenologist can do justice to the
observation that there is a distinction between seeing that such and such is




In fact, as Hubert Dreyfus has pointed out to
me, our bodily readiness often pulls us to-
ward beliefs that we know are wrong. And
yet, we still feel pulled to see things in a par-
ticular way. As examples of such a phenome-
non, Merleau-Ponty discusses perceptual il-
lusions like the way that the moon looks big-
ger when low on the horizon than when di-
rectly overhead, or Zöllner’s illusion. Al-
though we can demonstrate to ourselves that
the moon is always the same size, still the
»various parts of the field interact and moti-
vate this enormous moon on the horizon«
(PP, p. 31). Likewise, we can easily convince
ourselves that the lines in Zöllner’s illusion
are in fact parallel, but the overall configura-
tion of lines »motivates the false judgement«
by producing a bodily readiness that dispo-
ses us to the contrary beliefs (PP, p. 35).
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Mark A. Wrathall
Nicht-rationale Grundlagen und nicht-begrifflicher Inhalt
Die phänomenologische Tradition war lange Zeit der Auffassung, dass die natürliche Wahrnehmung
weder begrifflich artikuliert ist noch von deterministischen Gesetzen beherrscht wird, sondern dass
sie eher nach der praktisch artikulierten Struktur des körperlichen In-der-Welt-Seins organisiert ist.
Dabei bleibt die Erklärung dafür problematisch, auf welche Art und Weise die Wahrnehmung dem
Denken eine rechtfertigende Unterstützung bieten kann. Die Antwort der Phänomenologen lautet,
dass es die bedeutungstragende (nicht aber begriffliche) Struktur der natürlichen Wahrnehmung ist, die
uns ermöglicht, über Objekte nachzudenken, indem sie die einzelnen Gedanken über die Objekte
motiviert, wie sie sich in der Wahrnehmung darstellen. Der Autor zeigt, welchen Ausweg aus den
Sorgen der modernen Philosophie des Geistes dieser Standpunkt weist.
Mark Wrathall
Fondements non rationnels et contenus non conceptuels
La tradition phénoménologique a longtemps considéré que la perception naturelle n’était ni actu-
alisée conceptuellement ni régie par des lois déterministes, mais qu’elle était plutôt organisée
d’après la strcture pratiquement articulée de l’être-dans-le-monde physique. Or, cela laisse entier le
problème d’explication de la façon dont la perception peut assurer un support justificatif à la
pensée. La réponse de la phénoménologie est que c’est la structure significative (et non conceptu-
elle) de la perception naturelle qui nous permet de penser des objets en motivant nons pensées sur
ces objets par la manière dont ils se présente à notre perception. Ce pont de vue permet de sortir
des problèmes qui tourmentent la philosophie de l’esprit contemporaine.
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